The Middle East: Separating The People From The Problem
by Meg Anderson
March 2005 |
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Fisher and Ury, on page 30 of “Getting to Yes,” use the Middle East negotiations as an illustration of how emotions, a “people problem,” can overwhelm negotiation. They write, ”. . . Israelis and Palestinians alike feel a threat to their existence as peoples and have developed powerful emotions that now permeate even the most concrete practical issue, like distribution of water in the West Bank, so that it becomes almost impossible to discuss and resolve. Because in the larger picture both peoples feel that their own survival is at stake, they see every other issue in terms of survival.” To deal with “people problems” generally, they council acknowledging the emotions, allowing people to let off steam, and not reacting to emotional outbursts (30-31). But what happens when the emotions are so vitriolic that the outbursts are literally murderous? What happens when a pattern of violence is established that is so dire, and so long standing, that factions form on both sides who will kill their own leadership before they will permit any negotiation with their despised enemy to succeed? How is conflict transformation possible in this climate of perpetual animosity and outright warfare? My answer is that just as in this country, in the case of Brown v. Board of Education, the starting point for integration had to be the unequivocal establishment of the fundamental rights of the oppressed, so in the Palestinian -Israeli conflict the fundamental power asymmetry favoring Israel has to be addressed before we can reasonably expect to see relations between the two peoples normalize. How can a change this profound be effected by the parties themselves in the face of such high levels of antagonism and mistrust? History cautions that it cannot. In 1954, African-Americans had to appeal to a high court to be granted justice on which to build a new reality; similarly, there may need to be third party involvement in the Middle East, not just as mediators, but as arbitrators in some form, to whom Israel and the Palestinians submit themselves for the settlement of their most fundamental points of contention, and to whom they must answer for their actions. Then, from a rights-based settlement can grow genuine resolution; from a new political reality, complete with mechanisms of compliance, can grow a new relationship, and hopefully, from a cessation of violence can grow a lasting peace.
Michael Watkins and Kirsten Lundberg, writing in the April 1998 issue of Negotiation Journal, describe the genesis of the people problem this way: “ As conflicts escalate,[ . . .] A bifurcated world view develops in which “we” represent truth and justice; desire only security and self-respect; and respond as any reasonable person would to provocation. “They,” on the other hand,become depersonalized and vilified, their aggressive conduct the result of flawed and evil dispositions. Leaders on each side become important symbols of this perpetual bifurcation, simultaneously lauded as heroes and reviled as monsters”(123-124). Abdelmagid M. Mazen, in the October 1998 issue of the same publication, writes that many Jordanians refer to Israel as the “little Satan”(360). Shamil Idriss, chief operating officer of Search for Common Ground, an NGO working specifically on relational avenues to conflict resolution in the region, observes the biases of both sides. In his January 2004 article “Mideast Peace Won’t Come by Sweeping Conflict Aside,” he reports “In recent weeks, Israel’s army chief of staff and four former directors of Israel’s internal security service, the Shin Bet, have denounced Israeli policy in the occupied territories, stating that much of it is not meant to enhance security, but to humiliate Palestinians.” Further on he states, “When asked about interfaith dialogue, the most prominent Muslim religious scholar present responded, “We will not dialogue with the Jews.” In my own experience, I will never forget the time I was out to dinner with an Israeli man in his thirties. My assumption, based on my brief acquaintance with him, was that he would be among the large number of younger Israelis who see the power imbalance as unfair and want peace with the Palestinians. On the subject of his service in the military, I asked him what he thought about the conflict. He replied with perfect calm that “the Palestinians are not humans, they are dogs, and they should be shot like dogs.” He went on to add that “if you killed them all it would not be genocide, because they aren’t human beings.” The severity of these attitudes make both rights and interests based conflict resolution insanely difficult to pursue bilaterally.
This is not to say that there are not fantastic initiatives happening all over the region in terms of consensus building, dialoguing and combatting demonization on both sides. There are. A great many advocates for peace exist within both ranks, supported by a fine number of NGOs committed to helping eradicate pervasive stereotypes, and normalizing relations between the two groups. The renunciation of their own security policies by high ranking Israeli army and security officials, as cited above, is evidence of a sea change in attitudes, particularly hopeful in those empowered to affect changes. But all efforts at relationship transformation, however positive and important, are hampered by the fundamental inequity of the status relations between the two groups. Ultimately, I believe, the best results they can achieve will be undermined by the imbalance of power for as long as it continues to exist. In “Dealing with the Dilemmas Posed by Power Asymmetry in Intergroup Conflict,” authors Nadim N. Rouhana and Susan H. Korper examine the relational stalemate between Jewish and Arab citizens of Israel taking part in a workshop specifically created by an NGO, The Van Leer Jerusalem Foundation, to “provide an experiential framework for modifying attitudes.” Their analysis includes these observations: “. . . regardless of other aspirations for intervention outcomes, the mere existence of a structural power asymmetry dictates that the larger societal goal of the higher power group is to maintain the structural status quo and thereby preserve its own power, while the lower power group’s goal is to get a bigger share in the balance of power between the groups -- that is, to change the status quo [. . .] Even for those members of the higher-power group who regard the power asymmetry as needing some modification to a more equitable power-sharing relationship with the other community, the assumption is often that decreasing the intensity of overt conflict is a prerequisite to modification of the power relationship. By contrast, the lower-power group considers overt conflict to be symptomatic of what it regards as the inequitable distribution of power. For members of this group, a clear-cut change in the power relationship is a prerequisite to reducing conflict intensity, and the first step toward such a change is for the higher-power group to recognize the inequity of the distribution of resources in the society. Accordingly, for the lower-power group, the primary issue to discuss is the power asymmetry itself ”(Negotiation Journal, n.p.).
On the basis of this and the other texts I have studied, I am lead to conclude that if a resolution of the people problem is possible at all, it will only come after a settlement is agreed on that corrects the power imbalance, since it is the root of their relational issues. This, in turn, leads me to the belief that only a peace accord that produces such a settlement will last. It seems clear to me from my readings that the peace plans of the past have born within them the seeds of their own destruction in being based on a “staged” negotiation strategy, one in which only the comparatively simple issues are tackled initially. I understand the appeal of such a graduated process, and certainly wiser heads than mine have judged it to be the most practicable route to get the two sides talking, but if the most difficult issues are always saved for later in a process involving two groups of people who, as Fisher and Ury point out, can barely surmount the easiest of obstacles together, then is it surprising that the fragile peace repeatedly collapses before the tough substantive issues ever get resolved? Watkins and Lundberg concur that “. . . staged agreements have proved to have their drawbacks. By settling the “easy” issues first the contending parties were able to build momentum towards agreement. But this left the “hard” issues - Jerusalem, settlements, refuges, borders - to be worked out at the end. The logic was that increasing confidence would make these issues easier to manage, but this has not proven to be the case”(134 ).
Abdelmagid M. Mazen describes this “delimma for negotiators” saying, “In cases where it is difficult to separate settlement from resolution neatly, the prescription to start with smaller behavior achievements (in the hope of changing attitudes in the long term) may not always work. Powerful players in some situations may aim to “liquidate” the smaller, incremented achievements before they amount to anything significant”(136). Mazen discusses the distinction between settlement and resolution, equating settlement with behavioral change and resolution with attitude change (357). It is on this basis that I suggested in my opening paragraph that settlement could lead to true resolution. He goes on to describe a model of persuasive communication which distinguishes between “two distinct routes to persuasion; central routes that emphasis argument-based thinking; and peripheral routes that designate psychological mechanisms not involving the central argument”(364). He summarizes the relative efficacy of the two routes saying, “The model further suggests that persuasion and attitude change that result mostly from discussing and elaborating on issue-relevant arguments (i.e., resulting from adopting central routes) will show greater temporal persistence and greater resistance to counter persuasion than attitude changes resulting mostly from peripheral cues”(364). This supports my contention that comprehensive conflict resolution in the Middle East needs to be anchored in concrete, substantive change, not on “peripheral routes” and “staged” half measures, however laudable their aims.
The failure of the Oslo accords to get to the root of the problem, and the need for third party involvement with the authority to enforce agreements between the two sides, is further underscored by the following observation by Daniel Lieberfeld, in The Negotiation Journal, January 1999: “The stark imbalance of power in Israel’s favor at the time recalls the paradox, raised at the outset, of why, given its strength, Israel should choose to compromise. Part of the answer is that Israel’s preponderance of power enabled it virtually to dictate the terms of the negotiations that produced the 1993 Declaration of Principals. Most of the compromising was done by the PLO, particularly its commitment to a phased negotiation process with no guarantee of achieving statehood in the final status talks”(75). The point is driven home by the Palestinian negotiator Omar M. Dajani, who participated in the talks at Camp David as well as in Taba. In describing the outcome of Oslo and the origins of the Joint Economic Committee he writes, “The interim self-government arrangements defined by Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization in the Oslo accords did not establish a relationship of parity between the two sides [. . .] The Joint Economic Committee (JEC) was built on the same model [. . .] the JEC’s structure made it particularly ill-suited for dispute resolution: like other joint committees, it was comprised of equal numbers of Palestinians and Israelis, who were required to reach all decisions “by agreement.” Moreover, there was no forum for appealing the JEC’s decisions (or failure to reach a decision), as referral to conciliation or arbitration also required the agreement of both parties [. . .] The Palestinian side, which had more to gain from altering the status quo than the Israeli side, was obliged to defer to Israel’s interpretation of the agreements, often with unhappy results for the Palestinians”(Negotiation Journal, July ‘04, 402). In a companion article, Mr. Dajani’s counterpart, Bari Bar-Zion, a member of the Israeli negotiating team, expresses equal dissatisfaction with the results produced by the existing structures. The Wye River Memorandum was drafted at a summit convened by President Clinton in 1998 with the intention “to clarify mutual responsibilities of the parties in implementing a further step of “Oslo II”(Negotiation Journal, July ‘04, 384). Discussing the economic component of the Wye River Memorandum, Mr. Bar-Zion laments that “what should have taken two months was still not resolved to the satisfaction of both parties after nearly two years. Finally, an agreement was signed due to time constraints and third party pressure. As far as the Israeli side is concerned, the outcome of the negotiations was far from successful. Many of the Israeli interests were unmet and their major concerns remained unresolved”(397).
Clearly, nobody is happy with the status quo. Ultimately, that’s the good news. Among those working in the field of conflict resolution there is a popular notion known as “conflict ripeness.” It refers to the convergence of a sort of perfect storm of motivating factors, or a tipping point of opportunity. The factors involved include: recognition that efforts at coercion are futile, that the status quo is self-defeating, that a special opportunity for negotiation has arisen, that leadership changes within the governments involved favor pragmatism, and that there are no alternative partners enabling the adversaries to bypass each other. (Lieberfeld, Negotiation Journal, Jan. ‘99, 65.) We would appear to be on the cusp of just such a point of “conflict ripeness” right now. Yasser Arafat’s death has created a wholly unique possibility for re-engagement in the peace process. Every indication is that both sides are willing to do so. On Dec. 8, 2004, the Associated Press reported: “Israel and the Palestinians have agreed on the logistics of the upcoming election to replace Yasser Arafat. The agreement comes amid signs of warming ties following Arafat’s death. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has said he would like to meet with top Palestinian officials after the election and has offered to coordinate his planned withdrawal from Gaza with them [. . .] Interim Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas, a leading candidate to replace Arafat, has been negotiating with militant groups to end attacks on Israel and has pressured Palestinian media to stop disseminating anti-Israel propaganda.” Egypt is currently taking measures to improve their own relations with Israel, positioning themselves to help broker peace with the Palestinians. Israel has solicited Egypt’s support as it plans it’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip next year(AP, 8 Dec.’04). That Mr. Sharon proposed the withdrawal and was able to secure the votes he needed to enact it, is evidence of Israel’s current willingness to embrace pragmatic solutions that require giving up ground - literally - to make peace with their neighbors. That Egypt is publicly calling on the Palestinians to take advantage of the opportunity before them (nytimes.com, 6 Dec. ‘04) is significant in terms of the “conflict ripeness” model as well. That they are no longer willing to wage war against Israel is an indication that the day has passed when the Palestinians could count on the Arab nations in the region to take up arms with them. This growing attitude of acceptance towards Israel by the Arab world in turn pressures the Israelis to respond in kind or risk international censure. As much as we support them, neither we, nor any of their other allies, would in all probability tolerate a return to the levels of violent engagement of the past. We expect them to sue for peace, and our expectation helps create the conditions that favor it.
So far so good. But how far towards a true balance of power and a restoration of Palestinian rights is Israel really willing to go voluntarily? What happens if the talks, which we can assume are upcoming, don’t go far enough to appease the militant factions on the Palestinian side? The fact that Mahmoud Abbas has been involved in past peace negotiations and is perceived as a moderate may be good for Israel, but could be bad for Abbas himself, if he is not perceived at home as tough enough to stand up for Palestinian rights. Elias H. Tuma, professor emeritus of economics at the University of California, Davis, Ca. , in a piece published by the Common Ground News Service, had this to offer: “Sharon and his government must express their respect for the legitimate Palestinian objectives, including their own independent state within the pre-June 1967 borders; their rights to a shared if not divided Jerusalem; and the rights of the Palestinian refugees to compensation if not a return to Israel [. . .] If Israel promises to cooperate toward realizing these objectives without infringing on its own rights, the new Palestinian leaders will acquire leverage and credibility to negotiate not only with Israel, but also with various radical and violent-oriented Palestinian factions”(Arafat’s Legacy and the Peace Process, 3 Dec.’04). There being no effective world court in existence at this time, I fear that my ideal solution, binding arbitration by a neutral body, is highly unlikely to occur. However, the lead story on the front page of this morning’s New York Times offers hope in two forms. First, it describes unfolding scenarios that include a concerted aid effort by numerous countries and organizations, particularly the World Bank, that have both the authority to impose conditions and the ability to reward progressive behavior. Second, it notes that “Some European leaders, anticipating increased leverage as European financing for the Palestinians increases, are pressing Israel and the Palestinians to start talking soon about difficult issues like Jerusalem, the boundaries of a Palestinian state and the status of refugees.” Clearly, somebody agrees with me that a radical departure from the strategies of the past is necessary, and that the timing seems right to tackle the big issues once and for all. Sadly, its the US that seems poised to stand in the way of such an initiative. The Times article states, “The Bush administration and Mr. Sharon’s government want those issues put off until the Palestinians show more progress against terrorism.” It will be a crying shame indeed if, at this extraordinarily opportune historical moment, our support of Israel undermines the conflict’s “ripeness” by enabling her protectionist tendencies at the ultimate cost of peace and justice for all involved.
Bibliography
Bar-Zion, Bari. “Understanding Barriers to Peace: Reflecting on Israeli-Palestinian Economic Negotiations.” Negotiation Journal July 2004: 383- 400.
Dajani, Omar M. “Understanding Barriers to Peace: A Palestinian Response.” Negotiation Journal July 2004: 401-408.
Idriss, Shamil. “Mideast Peace Won’t Come by Sweeping Conflict Aside.” Search For Common Ground.org. 23 Jan. 2004. 8 Dec. 2004
“Israel, Palestinians Reach Election Plan.” Associated Press. 8 Dec. 2004. 8 Dec. 2004
Lieberfeld, Daniel. “Conflict “Ripeness” Revisited: The South African and Israeli/Palestinian Cases.” Negotiation Journal Jan. 1999: 63-82.
Mazen, Abdelmagid M. “When Settlement and Resolution Are in Conflict: Searching for a Mideast Peace Dividend.” Negotiation Journal Oct. 1998: 357-367.
Myre, Greg. “Egypt and Israel Trade Prisoners, in Sign of Rising Cooperation.” New York Times. 6 Dec. 2004. 8 Dec. 2004
Rouhana, Nadim N., and Susan H. Korper. “Dealing with the Dilemmas Posed by Power Asymmetry in Intergroup Conflict.” Negotiation Journal n.d. , n. pag.
Tuma, Elias H. “Arafat’s Legacy and the Peace Process.” Common Ground News Service. 3 Dec. 2004. 8 Dec. 2004
Weisman, Steven R. “Donors Consider Large Increase in Aid to Palestinians.” New York Times 17 Dec. 2004: A1+.
Comments
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| Amber
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11/25/05 |
| Land For Peace |
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A key component of successful mediations is the assurance that the parties will abide by any agreement reached. Where one party has repeatedly shown bad faith in fulfilling its part of its agreement, should the other one keep making more and more fruitless concessions in hopes that the breaching party will eventually honor its agreement? Where is the incentive for it to do so, when the concessions keep coming?
You state that it would be a "crying shame" if the party decided to insist on a show of enforcement before making yet more concessions, to the point of giving away enough to make the two parties equal. In litigation negotations, do you insist that as a starting point the insurance company give half of its wealth to the plaintiff, before they can begin discussing his claims fairly?
As for Fatima's concern with justice, as sad as it is to be deprived of your chosen home because you are not Jewish, it is even more sad to have your children targetted and deliberately killed because you are, wouldn't you say? If giving back every people whose ancestors ever lost a war or were otherwise relocated the land they are "entitled" was, as you say, simple and a matter of justice, our maps over every global mile not covered in ice caps would look very different. |
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| fatima
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03/23/05 |
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As a palestinian, the problem seems so simple to me. I was deprived from my home and heritage because I am not jewish, that is not fair. The solution is through justice, without playing games. |
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| Jonathan Reitman,
Brunswick ME |
jreitman@blazenetme.net
03/17/05 |
| Good questions |
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Having spent the past four summers in the Middle East teaching Negotiation, Mediation & Conflict Management to Israelis and Palestinians, I think you've put your arms around one of the thorniest problems: How to restore a balance of power.
You pose the central question succinctly: "...how far towards a true balance of power and a restoration of Palestinian rights is Israel really willing to go voluntarily?"
There are of course no easy answers. My sense, though, is that (perhaps ironically) it is ISRAEL that needs reassurance here. Israelis are skittish and distrustful of the "reality" of the willingness of Palestinians to forgo violence and return to a state of normalcy. And yet they desparately want that.
So the answer to your question, I think, is that Israel will go only as far toward relinquishing power (and thereby restoring some "balance of power") as it can go while providing safety for its people.
The NEXT, and even more difficult question is: what must happen in order for Israel to feel safe enough to give up power and control OVER Palestinians, thereby allowing it to tear down the physical and metaphorical "separation barriers" it has constructed.
Thought provoking article. Thanks. |
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